Islamic Education in Minority and Majority Contexts
The Cases of Tunisia and Germany

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Table of Contents

Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................... 3

Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 4
  Methodology .................................................................................................................... 5
  Case Selection .................................................................................................................. 6
  Argument .......................................................................................................................... 7

Foundations of the Argument .......................................................................................... 8
  Education in the Development of State and Nation ....................................................... 8
  Islam as the Curriculum .................................................................................................. 10

Background ....................................................................................................................... 14
  Tunisia ................................................................................................................................ 14
  Germany ............................................................................................................................ 16

Securitization .................................................................................................................... 21
  Fighting Islamism and Extremism in Tunisia ................................................................. 21
  Fears of Radicalism in Germany ....................................................................................... 26
  Citizenship, Integration and Categories in Germany ....................................................... 28
  Overseeing of Space ......................................................................................................... 30

State and Society Contestation ......................................................................................... 31
  Muslims and the State in Germany .................................................................................. 32
  Old Arguments, New Contexts in Tunisia ........................................................................ 42

Conclusion & Recommendations ....................................................................................... 44
  Recommendations .......................................................................................................... 45
  Suggestions for Further Study ......................................................................................... 46
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**Introduction**

As Muslim countries in the 20th century have gained independence and begun developing nation-states along the Westphalian model, there has arisen a question of how religion and government should interact. This question is not unique to Islam, but in the Islamic world, especially in the Middle East, policy-makers, citizens, and outsiders have been especially entangled by it for the past three decades. One response to the issue is the creation of state-led education in Islamic principles, so all students can have the same basic religious knowledge that is vetted and monitored by the state.

More recently, European countries have begun to look into Islamic education programs (especially for Muslim students) outside the treatment Islam gets in history and ethics classes. Austria and Belgium have had optional classes for some time, and several German states have programs in development (“Islamic Education in Europe”). Islamic education has so long been
an indicator of religious establishment; how can we explain why European governments, seemingly secular with Christian backgrounds, would be working to add it to their curriculums?

The obvious answer is that European countries have experienced a wave of immigration from Muslim-majority countries, creating substantial Muslim minority populations on the continent. This answer does not address the exact motivations of European governments, though, nor how we should classify these new programs. Can we expect them to share characteristics with Islamic education programs in Muslim-majority countries? Will different goals lead to divergences in curriculum, structure, or effectiveness of the programs?

Methodology

In order to answer this question, we used a comparative case-study of Germany and Tunisia. In gathering data on these cases, we embarked upon an extensive review of the secondary source literature, conducted interviews in Tunisia and Germany, and reviewed educational primary sources. Interviews in Tunisia included five students at Zeitouna University, four students from other branches of the University of Tunis, two high school students, one high school Islamic thought teacher, one inspector in the subjects of Islamic Education and Islamic thought, a parliamentarian for Afek Tounes, and the President of the Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy. Interviews in Tübingin and Münster, Germany were conducted with Islamic education teachers in training, students seeking a degree in theology, professors of theology, one Muslim board member, children at a local mosque, an Islamic education teacher working at the mosque and an imam. Most of the interviewees in Germany were German-Turks. Interviews were either recorded or written. Interview questions, surveys and consent forms were
put in German, French, Turkish, Arabic and English so that interviewees felt comfortable answering questions in the language of their choice.

Case Selection

We look at a European, Muslim-minority country and an Arab, Muslim-majority country in order to isolate the implementation of Islamic education as an independent variable. The differences between European and Middle Eastern and North African countries in demographics, history, and government make the similarities between them interesting, and allow us to implement the most-different selection model to create an exploratory framework that could be applied to other cases of state-led Islamic education.

We look at this problem using the cases of Germany and Tunisia. These cases specifically work very well for this study. Of all the European countries, only Germany, Austria, and the Netherlands have Islamic education in the public schools, publicly funded Muslim schools, and publicly funded teacher training for Islamic education (Berglund 2015). But of these, Germany combines the largest Muslim populations (about 4.5 million) with a much more state-involved model than that of the Netherlands. Education and religious education in Germany is run by each federal state. Currently there are Islamic education pilot programs implemented in some of the federal states, however the prospect that Islamic education will be officially implemented in those states is likely.

Tunisia, with its 99% Maliki Sunni population and lack of ethnic divisions, provides a useful foil to Germany’s more diverse Muslim and overall population. Of Middle Eastern countries, Tunisia is one of few with a currently functioning, unified public education system and a society with enough freedom of expression to allow for free debate of the education system.
At a policy level, Germany’s education program is currently in its pilot phase, and Tunisia is likely to soon undergo an educational reform, so both are in a position to benefit from this timely intervention.

**Argument**

We argue that in both majority- and minority-Muslim contexts, states will have an interest in creating a unitary Islamic education that elides differences between Muslim citizens. This grows out of a state need to securitize Islamic education to protect against physical and ideological threats, as well as an attempt to create a single, encompassing citizenship. States address these needs by attempting to create in their Muslim citizens unified values that do not challenge state authority. Muslim citizens want the state to be more accommodating of their own beliefs, which could include state disengagement from active securitization and state engagement in public morality. This will lead to contestation with the state over the form and content of Islamic education, which is tied to larger debates on citizenship and religion. The education system itself can vary in both its form and its content, and this variation is influenced by the ongoing state-society contestation.

Security is the prevailing motive for the state in this model. Tunisia and Germany see outside threats from international extremist movements and inside threats to the state from individuals and groups with Islamic ideologies. Both states work to build a citizenry that will show loyalty to the state and to their fellow citizens, so the unitary model emphasizes the overlap of Islam and citizenship. Muslim citizens want a minimum of state interference in their personal religious lives and a maximum of influence in the state’s production of religious content (which
can include wanting interference in the religious lives of others). Their contestation challenges state models that create securitized educational systems.

As will be seen with Tunisia and Germany, there is plenty of room for divergence within this framework, and indeed it is expected that countries with very different approaches to and histories with Islamic education will diverge. The purpose of the framework is to give us a context in which to understand these differences while identifying those aspects of Islamic education that remain constant.

**Foundations of the Argument**

*Education in the Development of State and Nation*

There is quite a bit of literature showing education both as a means of passing vital information to those who need it and as an essential part of the process of state- and nation-building. Yehudi Cohen (1970) argues that in ancient times, formal education was used as a political tool to serve political interest. He writes that institutions emerged with “civilizational states.” He defines a civilizational state as encompassing and unifying smaller economical, social and cultural entities—states like Rome, Egypt, Babylonia and Greece. Cohen argues that in order for the civilizational states to survive, local, tribal, or political loyalties had to collapse. These local loyalties were ultimately replaced by people loyal to the state. In order for elites to preserve the apparatus of the state, they had to be educated. Cohen further relays that schools in civilizational states formed naturally or “indigenously.” In non-civilizational states, however, schools were imposed from outside as tools to subjugate and grow the new population (as cited in Fagerlind and Saha 1983, 33).
In ancient societies, over time, education expanded to different sectors. Kneller (1965) argues that due to societal complexities, knowledge transmission becomes institutionalized. Basically, traditional or informal teachings and transmission of knowledge are removed in favor of formal teaching and learning in accredited institutions, by certified teachers through official books (as cited in Fagerlind and Saha 1983, 35).

Durkheim (1977, as cited in Fagerlind and Saha 1983), argues that social transformations precede educational transformations. Social changes or occurrences in society create the precedence for educational transformations to occur. Both Cohen and Durkheim’s arguments show the state’s ability to use education as an agent of change on groups perceived to be resistant or disloyal to the state, to serve a political purpose. Furthermore, Cohen shows that since ancient times, education has served as a tool for state survival and propagation.

Darden (forthcoming) continues this work, showing that a national “scholastic revolution,” or push to institute mass education, is determinative of national identity. He shows that campaigns that result in over 50% literacy and have nationalized content create a durable national identity, one that cannot be shaken from future generations.

Modern nation-states have mostly been established, with their national constituencies literate and, by Darden’s measure, inoculated against further nationalization. In a world where transnational migration and terrorism continue to play large roles in global affairs, however, nations still feel under ideological threat. Keller’s argument conveys that the way states control societal complexities and loyalties is by formalizing teaching, knowledge and institutions of learning. The theories suggest that using education as a tool for social change is a universal idea, and one which can be mobilized to face these new ideological threats. We argue that it has, and
show that in the case of Tunisia and Germany questions of Islam, citizenship, and security are addressed in part by the education system.

*Islam as the Curriculum*

Education is not a binary. In Islamic education, the “how” is as important a question as the “whether,” and indeed the particular type of educations students receive has been the subject of contestation in both countries studied. In analyzing Islam and the teaching thereof, we think that descriptions of moderate, radical, extremist, fundamentalist, etc. are very important to note in the course of textual analysis but not to use in our own definitions and categorizations of the data. Therefore when we use these words we are usually referring to how Islamic actors or movements are described by the state or by other actors.

For pedagogy, a useful touchstone is the work of Yusef Waghid (2011), who discusses the concepts of minimalist and maximalist Islamic education. Minimalist education may focus on how to pray, what to do before prayer, Qur’anic recitation, and consistence (i.e. in discipline and respect). It also focuses on self-directed learning and memorization which, according to Waghid, is not as flexible because the one who is learning is often not able to or willing to question. Once used to simply committing to memory, the individual will take for granted the source of hadiths or interpretation the Qur’an. Last, minimalist education may lead learners to see Muslims as inherently (and exclusively) ‘good’ without the learner thinking critically as to why they follow or support specific people.

Waghid defines a maximalist Islamic education as knowing why—the learner thinks critically about Islamic practices, sources and rituals. The learner is able to question different claims and have debates. Maximalist education would contend that no one scholar really has all
the answers or can fully make claims to religious truth. Lastly, a Maximalist education relays that one should not only respect or support their own group members, but that Islam calls for respect and justice for all (Waghid 2011 2-5).

We also draw upon Cesari’s definitions of secularity, the general term, and secularism, the specifically Western model. Secularity is determined by the “protection by law of all religions and equidistance of the state vis-à-vis all religions.” This definition leads her to discard many “secular” labels in the Islamic world. States that nationalize Islamic institutions, teach Islam (exclusively) in schools, or use elements of it to inform or justify their legal system are breaking the equidistance that she claims to be necessary to secularism. This is in contrast to the way these states’ governments may see and present themselves, which is often in keeping with Western secularism’s association of secularity and modernity. In Turkey and Tunisia, for example, leaders attempted to bring their countries out of a “traditional” Islamic past and into modernity. Even as these states were successful at privatizing religion to some extent, they kept Islam an important part of the public sphere and thus were unable to be true secular states (Cesari 2014 5-12).

Starrett shows how the state’s use of education extends to Islam in talking about the “functionalization” of Islam, through which states seek to use religion to effect a new system of morality in their citizenry. Starrett shows that Egypt, in marrying a European mass schooling model to a particular conception of Islam, attempted to “provide an inexpensive mechanism of centralized and nearly total control over the inner lives of Egyptians” (Starrett 1998, 10, 15). The school system thus “simplifies, systematizes, and packages religious traditions,” rendering Islam a “tangible, measurable object.” This simplification of Islam has allowed Islamist actors to take
control of the narrative, casting the Qur’an as the source of all knowledge and rejecting the current religious and political order (Starrett 1998, 231-2).

Starrett’s argument is about Egypt, but the story he tells of a state attempting to emulate a “modern” European government while continuing to include in its program Islamic language and thought is familiar. Indeed, Cesari’s work (2014 see chart on p. 12) suggests that it is familiar in much of the Muslim world. The edited volume *Teaching Islam* would also seem to suggest this, with case studies Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Syria, and Turkey all showing the state using Islam to inculcate its desired values into the citizenry. As the editors say in their conclusion, “each country’s representation of Islam has unique features and reflects the policy interests of the state” (Doumato and Starrett 2007). Mazawi also sees Arab states as using education to “modernize” their population, often using Islamic rhetoric and content to achieve this (2005, 139).

In these depictions of state-led Islamic programs, students are given a rote-learned explanation of how Islam supports the state’s agenda and are then set loose on the world. This view of the education system bears a strong resemblance to the reification of Islam that Starrett says contributed to salafism, jihadism, and Islamism in Egypt. We cannot adjudicate any potential connection between this type of education and challenges to state and society based in Islam, but Starrett’s critique is important because it is echoed by some societal actors in both Tunisia and Germany. Also important is Feuer’s (2014) work, which shows us a model in which the ruling regime adjusts the level of religious establishment based on how it perceives its own religious legitimacy in comparison with its most prominent opposition. This demonstrates the power of the state’s threat perception in decisions of shaping education systems.
In Muslim-minority contexts, similar trends are at play but with potential for even greater conflict between government and its Muslim citizens. Cesari (2009) argues that what has occurred across Europe is the process of securitization and politicization towards Islam. In the case of Europe, securitization is the process of states securing themselves against the threat of Islam and Muslim groups. The state takes action and reassures its citizens that it will prevent violent acts from occurring. Politicization of religion poses a threat to a religion's (Islam’s) survival because a non-religious actor is perceived to have interfered in the religion. This can lead to some resentment towards the non-religious actors by devout followers of Islam (Cesari 2009, 9). Both securitization and politicization towards Islam are reinforcing agents. That is, more security measures by the state lead to increased suspicion by certain Muslim groups, some of whom are skeptical of the state. Others who are even more resentful may carry out violent acts against the state in attempts to secure or validate their own ideology, which in turn leads to more securitization by the state. Germany uses both extreme and non-extreme actions towards the securitization of Islam. An extreme or ‘heavy-handed’ approach can be seen in police raids on Muslim groups accused of promoting terrorism, or state investment in computer surveillance systems to monitor Muslim “spaces” (Cesari 2013, 95), whereas a non-extreme or ‘light-handed’ approach is the state facilitating programs or showing equality to Muslims in order to obtain desired outcomes in accordance to the state's interest. Cesari (2013) and Berglund (2015) note that the state sees Islamic education and Islamic theology as the solution for the integration of Muslims. Basically, Islamic education and theology are being used as tools for social change. Berglund relays that, “securing equal rights for religious minorities is one side of the coin, the other side is the tendency to use public funding of education as a coercive means of achieving
social cohesion (integration) as a way to mold the conduct and thinking of Muslim populations” (Berglund 2015, 8).

Our framework for comparison incorporates elements of each of these theories. The government uses a model of unitary education to neutralize threats to its physical and ideological security. In both Tunisia and Germany these threats come from both the outside (international terrorist groups) and the inside (Islamist threats to the state and potential recruitment of young people into radical organizations). The state is also attempting to build a citizenry that will show loyalty to the state and to their fellow citizens, so the unitary model emphasizes the overlap of Islam and citizenship. Muslim citizens will also have interests in how curriculum and the education system are structured, and will pressure the state to take these interests into account. These can be negative desires, content that cannot be put in or red lines that cannot be crossed, or positive ones, elements that must be incorporated for education to be “Islamic.” This contestation shapes the content and form of Islamic education.

Some brief background on the Tunisian and German education systems is provided next, after which we will compare Tunisia and Germany in sections on the securitization and contestation aspects of Islamic education.

Background

Tunisia

It is no accident that the father of Tunisian nationalism and the founder of modern Tunisian education are the same man. Khairreddine Pasha, a prominent 19th century prime minister, founded the Sadiki College in 1875 (Anderson 1986, 159). Sadiki is notable because it was a western-style school put in place before the French protectorate. This would give Habib
Bourguiba (and others, as seen below) the ability to call back to an “authentic” Tunisian effort to westernize education, rather than have to deal with it as a purely colonial imposition (Feuer 2014, 140). Its combined western and nationalist credibility made Sadiki into a veritable assembly line for elites in the revolutionary-cum-ruling Destour party. In fact, between 1955 and 1973 over half of the elites in the party had attended the college (Stone 1982, 147).

The Tunisian education system has displayed a modernizing impulse toward Islamic education since independence, but there have been some changes, especially in the role of Zeitouna University and the organization of the public school system. Zeitouna University, which as a part of Zeitouna Mosque had been a central part of the Tunisian religious education system, was officially split off from the mosque in 1955 and placed under the authority of the Ministry of Education. In 1960 it was incorporated into the University of Tunis and renamed the Zeitouna Faculty for Religious Studies (Republic of Tunisia, Law Number 60-38, Chapter 3, Article 20). This change would last until the Zeitouna University name was restored in the beginning of Ben Ali’s regime, which was seen as a concession to Islamist actors (Dunn 1994, 156). However, this corresponded with a reduction in students at Zeitouna and an effort to reduce the influence of the university’s graduates on public schools, so this interpretation is questionable (Zeghal 2009, 117).

In the primary and secondary schools, the major reforms were in 1958 and 1991. The 1958 reform set up the Tunisian school system, including a class on civic and religious studies. This class was not a particularly important one – in the first two years of schooling it was 1.5 hours out of 14 per week. In the third through sixth levels it was between one and 1.75 hours out of 24 per week (Sraieb 1979, 24). In 1968, the program was changed slightly – there were now two separate classes, with the “Qur’an and Morals” and “History and Civic Instruction” portions
separated – the latter added only in the fifth and sixth levels of primary school. Still, the overall time spent in these classes did not change (Sraieb 1974, 110-11).

More significant changes came with the new President, Zein El Abidine Ben Ali and his new education minister, Mohamed Charfi. Charfi was not a natural ally to Ben Ali, having long been a part of the leftist opposition. He agreed to be education minister, though, in part to correct what he saw as an Islamicization of curricula (Charfi 2005, 146-7). In 1991 he oversaw a wide-ranging overhaul of curriculum, the writing of many new textbooks, and a correction (in his view) of an orientation away from secularism and critical thought (Charfi and Redissi 169-172). There was a great degree of controversy to this reform, and religious education entered the limelight. The only other major reform to happen since Charfi’s has been in 2002, which changed some of the content but was in the same general spirit as the 1991 reform (Personal Interview with Education Inspector March 12, 2015).

The current Islamic education curriculum consists of nine years of Islamic education classes at the primary and middle levels, followed by secondary education, which is divided into tracks: literature, technical sciences, empirical sciences, mathematics, informational sciences, and economics and finance. Of these, literature has four years of Islamic thought, economics and finance has two years, and the rest have three years (Ministry of Education 2008, Personal Interview with Education Inspector March 12, 2015).

Germany

Since 2010, there has been growing coverage concerning the creation of Islamic education classes in public schools and Islamic theology programs in Germany. There are several reasons why the German government is paying closer attention to the demands of the Muslim
Minor & Norris 17

community for Islamic education, along with investing in departments of Islamic theology. The discourse has changed regarding immigration and citizenship policy in Germany. The assumption that Muslims and non-ethnic Germans would one day return to their country of origin is no longer part of the policy debate. Nor is there a debate concerning the assimilation of Muslims and non-ethnic Germans. German Chancellor Angela Merkel's statement, “Islam belongs to Germany,” not only reflects a change of thought, but a change in the way the state is attempting to treat Islam and Muslims in Germany (Rinke, 2015). The current conversation in Germany concerns integration, equality and security, not assimilation or dichotomies such as East versus West.

Before discussing integration, equality and security from the state’s perspective, it is important to quickly explain why there has been a growing interest in Islamic education and theology from a community perspective. There is a growing demand for Islamic education in Germany from Muslim parents, organizations and communities. Much of this has to do with the feeling of marginalization, in addition to Muslims wanting to build a sense of identity, community and support systems. Christian and Jewish children can receive religious education in public schools, whereas it has been difficult for Muslims to obtain their own religious education. Reasons for the Muslim community's difficulty in securing Islamic education will be discussed further. Currently the number of Muslim pupils in Germany is 700,000 (Robbers, 72). Officials estimate that they will need over 2,200 official Islamic Education teachers to teach Muslim students.

In terms of building community and support systems, in the next 15 years, there will be a demand for 120 graduates in field of Islamic theology per year. There will be a need for post-graduates to work as: “imams for mosques, representatives for Islamic representation groups,
pastoral care-workers in families and neighborhoods, professors, researchers, teachers, translators etc (Özdil 2011).” From a quantitative standpoint, Islamic education and Islamic theology is very much in high demand. From an economic view, the demand for teachers and theologians within certain occupational fields relays the Muslim community’s need for social impact and representation. The government recognizes the demand of Muslims’ wish for greater equality, the future job market of Islamic theology and positive community growth for Muslims in Germany. However, it is questionable if this is the only thing that the state wants.

The German constitution grants freedom of religion to all people. The state is to be “neutral” in respect of religion and worldviews (i.e. the state must not identity with a specific religious institution), and the state should give equal treatment to all religion” (Robbers, 69). The equal treatment of all religions is particularly important as it relates to religious education. In Germany, the separation of church and state exist, along with the formation of a church and state partnership. Even though there is a partnership, the separation of church and state is “strict and specific” which allows for the state and church to respect the separation and not interfere in the sphere of the other (Robbers, 62). This cooperation, defined by Mauch (2010) as a ‘limping separation’ and Robbers as “the middle of the road approach” enables the right for religious institutions, which are seen as representatives of the religious community, to form associations and receive legal-entity status and rights. Second, the cooperation of church and state enables the teaching of religious education in public schools.

The ability of the Protestant churches, Catholic Church, Jewish communities, etc. to form their own religious associations enables the state to find reliable and/or well formed partners to cooperate with. In order for religious groups to create an “official” religious association, they must have a representative to represent the community and define the principles of the religion
(Berglund 2015). The cooperation of church and state enables the teaching of religious education in public schools. The state must provide funding for religious education, higher institutions of learning (i.e. theology programs at public universities) and tax breaks to different religious associations.

Religious education teachers must be believers of the faith they teach. They should have a degree in teaching from a university theology degree program. After completing their program, religious education teachers are hired and evaluated by the state. Teachers must also receive approval to teach religious education from their affiliated religious community, who is represented by the religious association. Professors of theology go through this same process. A theology department or university can hire a professor, but professors of theology also need approval from the religious association before teaching university students and teachers in training. If the church/religious association does not approve, the professor cannot be hired.

Islamic education in Germany is a controversial subject. Currently, “official” Islamic education in Germany does not exist. Official Islamic education is presumed to start in 2017 and 2019 after the first Islamic education teachers in training receive their degrees from accredited theology programs. However, there are Islamic education pilot projects conducted in many federal states (i.e. Baden Württemberg, North-Rhine-Westphalia, Bavaria, Lower-Saxony etc.). North-Rhine-Westphalia has the oldest pilot program for Islamic Education. Earlier, the requirements for religious associations were mentioned. In the case of creating a Muslim association to enable the official teaching of Islamic education in public schools, the requirements are difficult to fulfill.

Unlike most Christian sects, Islam does not have a leader or a representative of the Muslim community who defines Islamic principles. Therefore, many Islamic organizations all
want to be involved in the implementation of Islamic Education. Each wants a cooperative relationship with the government but the state only wants to work with one partner.

The Alevis, who adhere to Shi’i Islam and Sufism, have a religious association and have official Islamic education classes in Hamburg (Berglund 2015 and Kehl-Bodrogi 2001). Although the Muslim community, the majority adhering to Sunni Islam, has a hard time meeting the requirements for official religious association status, in some federal states, (particularly Baden-Württemberg and North-Rhine-Westphalia), a Muslim advisory board has been established. It is assumed that the state will come to a consensus and allow the board to act as an official partner. Once this happens, Islamic education will become official. The curriculum for Islamic education follows the same process as curriculum drafted by other religious associations. Curriculum for Islamic education is created by theology professors. After completion, the Muslim advisory board looks it over to make sure that the curriculum consist of certain values of Islam and after, the curriculum is looked at by the state for approval. The overview of the curriculum by board members can create conflict due to certain beliefs that board members have or feel should be part of the curriculum.

Islamic theology programs in Germany are fairly recent. There are four Islamic theology departments in Germany: Münster-Osnabrück, Tübingen, Frankfurt-Giessen and Nuremberg-Erlangen (Berglund, 2015). According to the Federal Ministry of Education and Research, theology programs provide university students the opportunity to examine religious texts in a critical way. Islamic theology professors note that the programs provide training for Islamic education teachers, imams and young theologians. Students have the chance to interact with students from other theology departments and attend seminars on Christianity and Judaism. Students seeking a degree in Islamic theology can also study at theology programs in Europe and
the Middle East, including Zeitouna University. The goal is for students to have a well rounded education, to foster critical thinking and to expand their knowledge of Islam.

Securitization

The German and Tunisian states have both made Islamic education a part of the overall struggle against security threats to the state and populace, as well as trying to use it to promote a conception of citizenship in which there is no friction between nation and religion. They have done this through attempting to craft education to lessen extremism and controlling Islamic spaces. We will look at how the two states have worked to fight extremism and radicalization, create an Islamic citizenship, and control Islamic space through Islamic education programs.

Fighting Islamism and Extremism in Tunisia

The Tunisian state has felt under threat most from Islamist opposition and the threat of radical Islam. The Charfi reforms, taking place as they did in the shadow of conflict and eventual civil war in Algeria, were in many ways designed to preclude Tunisia from this same fate, or the even more frightening (to the regime and to many secularists) prospect of an Islamist takeover of government.

Sarah Feuer has provided an excellent history of how the Tunisian state has adjusted its level of religious establishment according to who opposed it (2014). We will sum up by saying that, save for a period in the 1970s-80s and the more pluralistic situation today, the major opposition in Tunisia has defined itself primarily either by Islam or a combination of Islam and Arabism. This has led the Tunisian government, already secularist by ideology, to adopt an aggressive secularism. Keep in mind our definition of secularity: Tunisia’s government is not
secular. Islam has an official status not only in the constitution and the education system, but also in government control of mosques and religious institutions. Nevertheless, the government has a clear history of attempting to play a secular, modernizing role and using its power in the religious sphere to accomplish this. From the beginnings of independence steps like abolishing the religious habus (endowment) land and subordinating Zeitouna University to the Ministry of Education showed Bouguiba’s preference for the secular over the religious. Tunisia’s 1956 Personal Status Code is another example: it cemented equal status for women and banned polygamy over the objections of religious figures (see Perkins 2014, 135-7).

With this in mind, we will focus on the Tunisian government’s last major reform, organized in 1991 by Mohamed Charfi, who described political struggle in Tunisia as “a to-and-fro movement between two poles…the force of action and progress, and the force of conservatism and immobility.” To him Bourguiba, though a dictator and a flawed man, had fought for action and progress (Charfi 2005, 21, 9-10). This was in contrast to the Islamists, who had no real program beside rejection of the West and women’s rights (Charfi 2005, 29-31).

Charfi was a man who believed in true secularity, making it clear in writings after his tenure as Minister of Education that he would prefer a conventional secularism in which the state need not teach Islam. The only thing that scared him more than a state-taught Islam, though, was an Islam taught by private entities that could indoctrinate youth (Charfi and Redissi 2009, 152-3). Charfi’s reform therefore worked to “exorcise from Tunisia's schools all aspects of political Islam, ranging from jihad, or holy war, to discrimination against women.” It also incorporated European Enlightenment thinkers and directed students to apply them to how they thought about Islam (Randal 1995).
The writings of Charfi and other secularists rarely fully acknowledge the level of repression under Ben Ali, especially for Islamists or those whose appearance was indicative of a more traditional faith. Islamists were jailed en masse, tortured and deprived. Surveillance was nearly total, and police power was nearly unlimited. Fear of Islamists was used to justify not only the security state but all of the “positive measures, social programs, public policies, economic guidelines, and international alliances” (Hibou 2011, 3-9, 182). Niqab bans instituted on university campuses continued even after the revolution (Reuters 2011).

It is clear that Charfi’s rhetoric and the official rhetoric share symbolism. Both privilege the aforementioned Khaireddine and his Sadiki School in the national narrative, minimizing the role of Zeitouna graduates (Hibou 2011, 214-15; Charfi 2005, 23-4). Charfi’s fear of Islamist influence also fits in well with the regime’s overall policy of *taijif almanaba’* or “drying up the source” of Islamist support (Nasri 2007).

Clearly in this time period both Charfi and Ben Ali felt under threat by Islamists, so how did they reform the curriculum to protect the state? Charfi clearly sees his policies as providing a rational Islamic education, and that this view would keep students from becoming fundamentalists. As he says, “No one could be a fundamentalist if they read Spinoza, Freud and Voltaire” (Randal 1995). The public school curriculum was reworked to address students’ identities while still preparing them “for a life that leaves no place for any form of discrimination or segregation based on sex, social origin, race or religion” (Education Law of 1991, art.1 al. 3, as cited in Charfi and Redissi 2009, 169). In textbooks written for the reform, students were shown the connections between their religion and the other monotheistic religions, introduced to “modernist” current Islamic thinkers, and taught how the Qur’an asks for tolerance, skepticism, and rationality (Charfi and Redissi 2009, 170).
This rationalist approach is continued in the current curricula. In the first year of secondary school’s Islamic thought class, students are taught in the unit on the Pillars of Islam on the integration and overlap of rationality and tradition in dealing with and providing evidence for the metaphysical. Rationality is to be shown as necessary in understanding tradition. One of the goals for students upon finishing the unit is that being and nature are divine creations, but nonetheless are explainable and conceivable. This rejects a more mystical view of being, and seems to aim to encourage students to apply critical thinking. The pedagogical section is vague, advising teachers to use examples from the students’ lives and from society at large (Ministry of Education 2008, 10-11).

The 1995 Zeitouna University reform also was aimed at a rationalization of curriculum. The reform decree asserted that the education program would include ensuring a “scientific background” so students could understand their religion in the context of other currents of thought (art. 2). It also separated Tunisian and foreign students into different faculties (art. 3, Decree 95-865, 8 May 1995) and introduced comparative religion classes (Zeghal 2009, 118).

Whether Charfi’s reform lived up to his (and Ben Ali’s) goals is up for debate. If you go by his stated goal of reducing salafism and jihadism, the six to seven thousand Tunisians who have gone to fight in foreign conflicts (Zaracostas 2015) and the twelve thousand stopped at the border seem to indicate a sizable proportion of these students did not take from this program what Charfi had hoped.

University students interviewed in Tunisia, while not a representative sample, showed very different understandings of Islam and its role in public life. When asked about how Islam could help reform the nation, answers ranged from “Islam is used by politicians as a distraction. It can’t do anything concrete” to “People should practice it” to guiding “how you deal with
people and spend money.” Despite this, no one expressed anything more than slight disagreement with the curriculum (Personal interviews, March 13, 2015). And these are students that attended the same high school! These opinions do have some basis in the curriculum, where the practice of Islam is shown to be a general good for societal relations (Ministry of Education 2008). Their disagreement, though, indicates a diversity of thought that the curriculum does not seem to address. While *ijtihad*, the reasoning required in making Islamic law, is addressed in the first year of secondary school, it is given three hours of class time in which its necessity in crafting Islamic law is emphasized, but interpretation in everyday life is not (Ministry of Education 2008, 13). Radwan Masmoudi, the president of the Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy in Tunisia, expressed frustration with this, saying that *ijtihad* was practiced under Bourguiba but not today (Personal interview, March 11, 2015).

Disagreement could be an indicator of critical thinking being passed on, and therefore a diversity of opinion. It is unclear, though, whether classroom dynamic would have contributed to this: while university students some could remember disagreeing with their teachers on one or two occasions, these were memorable events. Students still in high school could not come up with any disagreements at all. For the most part, as one university student said “I studied a little, I cheated a little, I got through it” (Personal interviews, March 12-13, 2015).

An Islamic Thought teacher echoes this, saying that students are in the class for the grade. Even when asked about which subjects interested people, the teacher says that the subject as a whole is just uninteresting. The teacher herself said she had only joined the profession because the university was closest to her house (Personal interview, March 14, 2015). An interview with an inspector for Islamic education corroborates this, saying that there simply is not enough time given to the subject to truly delve into Islam as a subject. And furthermore:
In these government schools and this system of what was known as "modern" education, the subject of religion and shar‘ia remained at the lowest level of time designated for teaching, it became meager. And after decades, especially in the last 20-30 years, there occurred an intentional marginalization and contempt for this subject in favor of other subjects. We could almost say that the religious education, the shar‘ia education of the students was middling or weak, looking at the hours they take up and in which the included content is studied. As I said especially after the 1991 reform the amount of teaching time shrank and the textbooks and subjects that are studied in this subject were not able to completely saturate Tunisian students in the education of their religion. Therefore, this vacuum, this space, this weakness in religious education caused some to search for other platforms and the way they approached religious study. The schools alone could not fulfill their need and so this caused them, as I said, to seek out other sources to know their religion (Personal interview, March 12, 2015).

This story is similar to what is said by Masmoudi. He says that with the Ben Ali regime focused on Islam as a “civilization,” they had a complete ignorance of what Islam actually teaches. With so many religious sources banned, young people turned to satellite TV and the internet, where salafists were propagating their particular vision of Islam (Personal interview, March 11, 2015).

These testimonies leave the Charfi reforms in strange territory. Despite the devotion to including lessons of tolerance, coexistence, and rationality, the Islamic education class as designed by Charfi was still attempting to convey a lot of information in little time. This seems to have lessened the chance to actually teach critical thinking and skeptical inquiry.

*Fears of Radicalism in Germany*

In 2008 Wolfgang Schäuble of the Christian Democratic Party commented what he saw as the purpose of Islamic Education in Germany. He stated, “If we compete with hate preachers by introducing Islamic education in public schools, this will lead to a transformation in the religious practice in mosque. It is more difficult to deliver a hate sermon from a professorial chair than from a pulpit” (Peter 2013, 131). Peter (2013) notes that parallels can be drawn
between Schäuble’s statement to that of Christian liberation theology and the transformation of the Church in 19th century Germany. During this time in history, the state through its support of a particular type of Christianity went against the Church.

Schäuble’s comments relay several assumptions. First, there is something inherently wrong with Islam, that Islam needs to be changed and this transformation can only happen with state support. Second, he announces mosque as informal spaces of knowledge and that unofficial teachers need to be replaced with ‘official’ teachers and third, the type of education happening in mosque is intolerant, could possibly lead to dangerous actions and that the state is unable to control certain speeches or knowledge transmissions happening in the mosque. Some of the current media coverage concerning Islamic education and Islamic theology as a tool for integration and security reinforces Schäuble’s comments. Headlines portraying such comments include, “Germany Seeks to Undermine Islamic Extremist with Religious Education” (PRI, 2015) and “Germany adds Lessons in Islam to Better Blend Its Melting Pot” (NYT 2014). Other statements regarding the need for security include, “We want to supplement this political discourse with a theological discourse in order to prevent that political Islam becomes the major point of reference for Muslims in Germany” (Schulze, DW 2010).

The quotes and headlines above emphasize the state's willingness and interest to use Islamic education as a tool to fight radicalization, in addition to fostering integration. Security, integration and globalization are interconnected. Some citizens from Germany, France, and Britain, along with citizens from Middle Eastern and North African countries, have gone to fight in Syria and Iraq. In addition, the Charlie Hebdo attacks in France, like other previous attacks that have happened in Europe and the U.S. (e.g. the London (2005) and Madrid (2004) bombings and 9/11) have increased the state’s willingness to use security in the form of surveillance,
physical raids or through softer approaches, such as Islamic education. However, Islamic education in Germany is not just about dismantling those who use hate to insinuate violence or curbing potential attacks. The state’s interest in Islamic education calls into question the types of Islam that officials feel do and do not belong in Germany.

Citizenship, Integration and Categories in Germany

Since World War II, Germany has revised its immigration, integration and citizenship policy. Policy changes were enforced due to an increase in the immigration population and internal attacks that resulted in the state’s fear of domestic and foreign ‘others.’ Such changes in policies coincide with the different categorizational shifts pertaining to the inclusion and exclusion of the non-ethnic German population (Minor, Unpublished). Categorizations such as non-ethnic German and non-European Union citizen versus ethnic-German and European Union citizen, foreigner/immigrant, the grouping of Muslim, Turk and Arab, and Moderate Muslim versus Non-Moderate Muslim revolve around the issue of integration, immigration and security (Hinze 2013, Cesari 2013, Bauder 2011, and Mandel 2008). In regards to the subjects above, there are five aspects to address. First, the presence of the non-ethnic German population has challenged and reinforced the construction of German-State national identity and ideology. The result has been the state's use of securitization to combat what it perceives as a challenge to its ideology. Second, Germany’s citizenship policy has changed from Jus Sanguinis (citizenship by blood) to Jus Sois (citizenship by territory). Being born in and residing in Germany is one requirement found in the 2000 Immigration Law. Hinze (2013) notes that this law granted naturalization rights but required that non-ethnic Germans give up their other passport, whereas the 2014 Citizenship policy, granted dual citizenship to the descendants of migrant workers who
came to Germany after World War II. Third, Turks, Arabs, Africans and others who were born in Germany, who speak fluent German and have or do not have a German passport, are still seen as non-German. Many Muslim interviewees in Germany relayed that in their hearts and minds they feel German even if others do not perceive them as German. Fourth, after 2004, Germany has tightened its laws, making it harder for immigrants from non-European Union countries to enter the country (Bauder 2011, 172-173). Lastly, Germany no longer strives for a policy of assimilation. The policy is now about integrating those who are currently living in Germany. The aspect of integration reinforces certain categorizations and dichotomies and the current dichotomy is ‘Moderate Muslim’ versus ‘non-Moderate Muslim.’

The state attempts to use Islamic education as a tool to combat radicalization, but it also sees Islamic education as a way to make every Muslim a citizen. Such dichotomies present that Muslims should either fall into the moderate camp or non-moderate camp. This leads to the perception that Moderate Islam is compatible with citizenship, whereas non-Moderate or traditional forms of Islam are not compatible with citizenship. If Moderate Islam is seen as the only category being compatible with citizenship, this calls into question whether the state is attempting to create a ‘Unitary Islam’ but in a German context. This is a fear that Muslims, including some of students interviewed, have. Skepticism towards the government’s plan to implement Islamic education is due to the securitization process towards Islam. Basically, people feel that the state is not being sincere in its attempt to show greater equality to Muslims.

It is hard to find concrete statements from German officials claiming that they support Moderate Islam, as some officials believe it aligns closer with state ideology. Such statements would undermine Germany’s secular identity because the state is to be ‘neutral’ in respect of religion (Robbers, 69). However, by acknowledging that Islamic education and theology is a way
to combat ‘Political Islam,’ ‘Hate Preachers’ or issues with integration, it is implied that the state thinks a different version of Islam or a different approach to Islam is the way to fix these issues.

**Overseeing of Space**

The type of space Moderate Islam is assumed to grow in and the type of space Traditional Islam is assumed to grow in calls into question what type of Islam the government is interested in. For example Mosques, which are perceived as producing a traditional religious context, are not government controlled spaces and because Islamic theology is quite new in Germany, there are very few German-imams in the country. Germany is interested in producing its own imams instead of imams coming in from other countries. German imams would have a degree in theology from a German Islamic theology program and they would be the ones to work in mosques, not foreign imams. Even though the government does not control the mosque, those with degrees from government funded institutions will be official imams and ordained to work in the mosque. Second, the space of the public schools is government controlled and the teachers currently teaching the pilot programs are not official Islamic education teachers. There are degree-seeking Islamic education teachers currently being trained in theology programs. They will teach in public schools a few years from now.

These spaces mentioned above can be broken down into formal spaces versus informal spaces of learning. Traditional Islam is thought to flourish in informal or uncontrolled spaces of learning. The state believes that in order to stop radical ideas from spreading, supporting state run Islamic education and theology initiatives is an option. The idea that modern spaces of learning brings about modern forms of knowledge transmission is very much tied into the securitization of Islam and the integration of the Muslim community.
In Tunisia, religious space has, since independence, been official space and has been subjected to various forms of control. The aforementioned takeover of Zeitouna and the regulation of the students there has been one dimension of this. Students at Zeitouna still feel this burden of regulation. Asked about changes after the revolution, one student said “Bad to slightly better than bad is not a change” (Personal interview, March 13, 2015).

In the brief period when Ennahdha ruled, the major change to state-Islam relations was a great deal less oversight over who ran mosques and mosque schools. This led to salafists taking control of many of these institutions, and many of these mosques were later closed down (Donker 2013). The firing of so many imams has since led to a shortage in imams (Masmoudi, Personal Interview, March 11, 2015). These are not the only policy changes that have come after the fall of Ennahdha. A document signed under the Ennahdha government with the sheikh of Zeitouna mosque, reopening “Zeitouna education” religion classes, was declared void by the current government, citing a lack of involvement by Zeitouna and that the document was symbolic in the first place (“Zeitouna education” 2015).

**State and Society Contestation**

The efforts of the Tunisian and German states to create a vision of Islam that will secure them against perceived threats is at odds with the interests and desires of a range of Muslim societal actors, who want Islamic education to fulfill their needs. This contestation can be seen in both Germany and Tunisia, though it takes very different forms. In this section, we examine these debates and how they have influenced and may continue to influence the form and content of Islamic education.
Muslims and the State in Germany

In Germany, Berglund (2015) relays that on one hand, Islamic education will be implemented and treated fairly like Christian and Jewish religious education, but on the other hand, because Islamic education revolves around the discourse of integration, some Muslims feel that the education could be used to produce a Germanized or “Unitary Islam.” Cesari (2013) writes, “The securitization paradigm encompasses the multifaceted process through which the normal rule of law is suspended in favor of exceptional measures justified by extraordinary situations that threaten the survival of the political community (83).” If one uses these theories in relation to Islamic education, they emphasize that bending normal rules of law allows Germany to show greater equality to its Muslim population, especially when a rule or regulation works for other religions but may not work for Islam due to structural differences. Islam unlike Catholicism or other religions does not have a head of church or hierarchy. For this reason, the government has allowed for the Muslim community to create Muslim Advisory Boards in place of a head of church. The bending of laws helps implement security measures because a Muslim Advisory Board or head of church is needed to implement Islamic Education. However, the show of equality by the State may not be seen as sincere in the eyes of some Muslim groups. The possible lack of perceived sincerity on the part of the state leads to contestation.

The ability for some federal states to allow their Muslim communities to create a Muslim Advisory Board as a replacement for a head of church is one example of the lessening of laws. On one hand, the state wants to show greater equality. Equality helps reinforce the narrative of Germany as an equal and secular state by loosening certain rules. On the other hand, this is due to security initiatives. States do not do things haphazardly. There has to be a return value associated with certain initiatives. For Germany, the return is knowing that official theology
students and Islamic education teachers will be teaching or giving sermons in non-governmental controlled spaces (mosque) and governmental controlled spaces (public schools). In addition, the state hopes that the students will convey a modern and positive discourse of Islam.

In enforcing its integration policy, along with protecting its secular ideological identity, the state wants others to aspire to do the same. For example, the board in North-Rhine Westphalia (NRW) had to re-adjust some of its beliefs to work with the state. When asked about state interest and working with the government, a board member from North-Rhine Westphalia relayed that in the beginning:

> It was a struggle to adapt to the [German] system. We just had to establish something. The government has the intention to have some kind of influence. They thought that the Qur’an schools wouldn't be necessary anymore [because of the pilot program] but it didn't come out this way. The Islamic board had to make compromises to allow the permission for women to teach, Shi’a to teach, to be more caring and to integrate them into the community. But when we made the compromises, the traditional community said that we [the board members] were too liberal because we made too many compromises (Personal interview, March 2015).

This statement showcases that compromises had to be made by both parties. On one hand, the government allowed for the creation of a Muslim board. Having the board enabled the creation of Islamic education pilot programs in some schools. This ultimately helped the state to have some influence or oversight in Islamic education. On the other hand, the Muslim board and the community really wanted to establish Islamic education and realized that it needed to make some changes to include other people and sects in the community.

Like any compromise, there will always be people who are either for or against certain changes. What happened in NRW depict that some people in the community were unhappy and compromises created rifts between what people considered as traditional versus liberal ideology and what the state viewed as equality versus discrimination. The statement by the board member
also depicts that the state assumed parents would not send their children to the mosque anymore for religious education because they would have the pilot programs in the public schools. This not only brings into question the state’s sincerity, but why officials would believe alternative schooling would persuade parents to not send their children to the mosque. Interviewees for this paper depict that religious education in the pilot programs is one to two hours per week. In addition, interviewees and teachers in training relayed that even when they become official teachers, they will not have enough time to teach children practical aspects associated with Islam such as reciting Qur’an or learning Arabic. There is only so much that could be taught within a given time frame. The possibly of parents not taking their children to the mosque will probably not happen because mosque are often seen as both a religious center and as a community center. The state in not wanting children to go to the mosque anymore had the perception that the mosque is seen as a threat to integration and is an uncontrolled space.

As discussed before, securitization can be of a light-handed and gradual approach rather than heavy-handed and explicit. Nevertheless, both can trigger skepticism. Many Muslims are excited for Islamic education and the state’s show of equality towards the population, but with the excitement comes questioning. Some of the students interviewed did relay that they were not sure of the state’s intentions. It is important to note that skepticism does not mean resentment. All of the students interviewed were very thankful for the chance to study at Tübingen and Münster and they want to use the knowledge and skills taught to them by their professors when they become teachers, imams and employees.

When asked a teacher in training what she thought about the state’s interest in Islamic education, she responded:

I think they want to control Islam and the Muslims in Germany with the help of Islamic education and the curriculum. They want to know what is going on and that no one
teaches something radical or supports terrorism. I am not quite sure if the government will say no, I want to add this or that [in the curriculum] or dismiss this or dismiss that.

This and other interviewees’ feelings concerning state control or monitoring are justified, and cannot simply be labeled as conspiracy. Again, even though the basic law says the state should not interfere in religious matters, the state's interest in Islamic education, the media coverage regarding Islamic theology, statements made by state officials regarding security and statements made by religious scholars about moderate or liberal Islam all lead people to question the state’s intentions.

In regards to statements made by religious scholars, some community members question the intention of Muslim scholars who receive significant media coverage for their views of Islam. Everyone differs in opinion and it is understood that scholars who receive coverage and those who do not receive coverage are sincere in their efforts in wanting to make sure the Muslim community are actively involved in society, economically viable and that people in the community have an understanding of their religion. However, some parents or community members may disagree with particular interpretations of Islam that some scholars discuss openly with the media. There is a fear that their interpretations could be transferred to teachers in training and that these students will transfer the knowledge to children in the public schools.

The interviewees mentioned that their professors are neutral in their teachings and that their personal views do not influence their lessons. This goes for both professors who talk to media and those who are not in the media spotlight. Two student interviewees from Tübingen and one from Münster stated:

“Our professors are objective. They don’t put in their own opinions. They are very good and they have a system” (Personal interview, March 2015).
“The professors support us. They know we are the first theologians in Germany and they encourage us to take courses with non-Muslims” (Personal interview, March 2015).

“Everyone is free to believe and think what he or she wants and even if a Professor has an opinion, our studies are not about his or her opinion” (Personal interview, March 2015).

Students commented that their professors are unbiased, open and receptive. Students also suggested that many community members are quite supportive of professors. Many see the professors as experts who are guiding, as one student stated, "the first theologians and Islamic education teachers in Germany.” However, some members in the Muslim community may not see the neutrality of the professors the way that students do, which leads to further skepticism of state funded Islamic education.

A similar questioning of the state’s intention is also happening with imams in Germany. People are questioning if Germany will one day take a similar stance as Austria, who recently banned foreign funding for Mosque and imams (“Austria Passes” 2015). Most imams in Germany come from Turkey and other counties in the Middle East. For example, The Turkish Islamic Union for Religious Affairs (DITIB) is an Islamic Organization in Germany that receives funding from Turkey. Imams employed by the Turkish Diyanet are sent to Germany because there are not enough German imams in the country (Bruce 2013). Currently the state is in partnership with Islamic organizations in Germany and Islamic theology centers to makes sure that imams from the Middle East receive German language classes and classes on the Basic Law, pluralism and education in Germany (Cesari 2013, 96).

However, organizations like DITIB come under scrutiny because of its ties to Turkey even though the organization says it is neutral and does not represent one country over the other (Bruce 2013, 141). The trap DITIB and other organizations find themselves in is that they are seen as representing a Turkish based Islam, not a German based Islam (Bruce 2013, 141). Due to
these transnational ties, German politicians are supporters of the training of German imams in universities. The argument is that German produced imams would know the situation in Germany better than imams from overseas, they would speak German fluently, and could potentially bridge the gap between German Muslims and non-Muslims. In addition, there is an element of securitization as German politicians think that German imams would counter the threat of fundamentalism (Turner 2010).

Student interviewees favored the teaching of imams from departments of theology because they felt German imams would know the situation in Germany better than imams from overseas. Professors and the Muslim board member favored the training of German imams because some foreign imams may not know how to answer a question if someone from their congregation asked something about Islam. Professors mentioned it is important that imams engage in dialogue with people, especially young citizens. In addition, they felt that some foreign imams do not answer questions posed by people going to the Mosque or may present an incorrect interpretation. Professors stressed the importance of critical thinking and that people should not take everything said at face value. The theology programs are meant to engage in critical thinking and dialogue. There is a hope that once imams graduate from these programs, they will create a positive environment for people at the mosque to ask questions, feel comfortable to agree or disagree with certain subjects in Islam and to know their religion.

Students tended to favor the training of German imams due to their own experiences as children attending religious education in mosque. Interviewees expressed that before they attended the theology programs, they did not know or understand certain subjects in Islam and that their imam did not really engage in deep thinking or perhaps did not know certain answers to questions. Students liked their mosque and appreciated their community but felt there was a lack.
As children and teenagers, they wanted to have a better understanding of Islam. Some students favored the creation of German imams but their feelings were bittersweet about this initiative. One student relayed that the imam at her mosque would possibly be the last imam to come from Turkey if Germany created a similar law to Austria.

There is an underlying element that perhaps people feel a connection to Turkey through the imports of imams. Mosques in Germany have been bringing in imams from other countries for years and for some Muslims, this process could be seen as the norm, even though these imams return to their home country after three to five years. One imam interviewed noted how hard he worked to be selected to go to Germany and that is was a good opportunity for him and his family. He had an oral and written exam, extensive education and he is one of one-hundred imams in Germany recently selected out of two thousand applicants in Turkey. The issue is that the government believes that this process is not sufficient. DITIB’s process is something that cannot be overseen by the state. The state would rather have imams go through a German process.

In terms of the state, the creation of German imams, similarly to the creation of Islamic education teachers does represent the government protecting itself from physical and ideological threats. The fear of extremism is tied to officials’ fear that their Muslim population needs to be well integrated and that the person who should enable integration is a German imam. It is the assumption that if someone is not integrated, they do not share that same values as the state and therefore they are a threat to the state. Integration is tied into the overall tightening of immigration law and citizenship. On one hand, the government does not want foreign influences putting other thoughts into the minds of German Muslims. On the other hand, German imams
having gone through university training would provide dialogue and be able to communicate with their congregation.

The interviews with students depict that they want state support without state interference. German-Muslims need state support to make Islamic education official because the state needs to work with a partner. However, due to the securitization towards Islam, Muslims question if the state will attempt to influence Islamic education or produce a Germanized version of Islam. When asking teachers in training if they felt that becoming a teacher put them at odds with the state’s intention, one interviewee stated that it makes her feel strange at times but nevertheless she is happy about the development of Islamic education in Germany. She also noted that the state will find out that teachers in training do not have any bad intentions. She specifically stated that she herself will teach her students peace and morality.

University students, professors and Muslim advisory board members are concerned for the security and well being of Muslim youth. They see groups like ISIS and other radicals as a threat. Likewise, they want children and community members to engage with their society and understand that it is ok if people have different points of view, backgrounds and faiths. Teachers in training, theologians and professors do not want children and teens to believe everything they hear about Islam from social media, religious leaders or even their parents. They want them to have critical thinking skills, to be confident, to know the meaning of pluralism, to be comfortable with their identity, to know their history, to love knowledge and to think about solutions to the problems in their society. A professor from Tübingen mentioned, “Indoctrination takes place when children and students are told something is the reality and they have to believe it. We want to teach students how to understand and to find information themselves and to deal with their problems by themselves” (Personal interview, March 2015).
In addition, all the professors mentioned how important it was for their students, children and the Muslim community to interact with Muslims and non-Muslims in German society. For professors and university students, security and integration is important but knowledge transmission is also an important aspect found with all interviewees. Knowledge fits into confidence, pluralism and the importance of transferring information. When asked if the education changed their opinion of Islam, if they shared their knowledge with others and how it changed their opinion of themselves interviewees stated:

I learned to discuss [in class] and I learned to say my opinion, and to say why I am thinking so and now I know more than before and I am free to discuss. I learned more to respect other religions because before I began to study here [Tubingen], there were conflicts between some Christians, between me and them, you feel that you are different and that you are not how they are. Sometimes you feel alone because when there was anything about Islam in the news, they said you are a terrorist. Now I know how to protect myself and I know why they think so, now I can explain to them in a better way (Personal interview, March 2015).

I started informing my parents more what I am learning. I am sharing my knowledge with them. They know the basic things, to pray. They are happy about the information of course. It is not that easy for them to get the information. Sometimes we sit and talk about things and it also helped to keep it in mind. It is a repetition for me (Personal interview, March 2015).

The university showed me something that was taught to me earlier is actually not a sin and I learned Islamic sources, how to research about my religion, how to go deep to get the information and I have learned to reflect (Personal interview, March 2015).

Over the years we always have male imams and therefore, only within the theology department, we have equality right now. Now women are going to study theology and they could be imams as well. They could also teach children and do the same thing as the imam (Personal interview, March 2015).

The quotes above showcase how Islamic theology has changed the knowledge of students in a positive way. It shows that the university space enables students to be confident in
themselves and to engage in critical thinking and understanding. The interviews relay that students are excited to share their opinions and the knowledge that professors provide them. Students’ feel confident that they will be the ones to shape their own version of a German-Islam. Most of all, students want to decide for themselves who they are, instead of the state or other people trying to figure out or define who they want them (university students) and the Muslim community to be.

Lastly, many elements that the students portray regarding critical thinking, the sharing of knowledge, along with the wish for university students and children to know the meaning of pluralism, to be comfortable with their identity, to know their history and to think about the issues in their society is very much part of the Islamic tradition and the importance of knowledge in Islam and the Qur’an. Such subjects presented cannot just be analyzed in a westernized light of interpretation, integration or security narrative. The students portray how compatible Islam and Islamic theology is with citizenship and democracy. In many ways, this can be analyzed through the context of critical thinking, something that is an important part of Islam. From what can be seen in the interviews, teachers in training and theology students are excited to present to students an Islam that does not completely become objectified within the narrative of security or integration. They want to teach Islam in a way that captures the knowledge, love of God and the choice that Islam gives for people to be their own person and individual.

Old Arguments, New Contexts in Tunisia

For Tunisians Islamic education is still very much viewed through the struggle over secularism that was being fought out in the Charfi reforms. In the new, Nidaa Tounes-led government, different currents within society are attempting to assert their interests on any
potential reform of the education system. There is a broad consensus that education as a whole needs reform, even if there is less on how extensive that reform should be (Personal interview, Radwan Masmoudi, March 11, 2015). Any reforms in the Islamic education system are likely to come as part of this broader reform bill. The idea that even as a “secular” system Tunisia needs religious education is not a controversial one. No one interviewed in Tunisia contested the need for religious education in the government schools, not even those who espoused more secularist principles. As Mohammad Draief, a parliamentarian with Afek Tounes, put it, “We are a civil state but we still have an identity,” and that identity must be taught to students. Still, he continued, “if we want to continue to be a civil state, the Islamic education we have is enough” (Personal interview, March 13, 2015). Draief’s party, Afek Tounes, calls for a review of the religious education structure in its platform, though it does not talk about the amount of Islamic education (Afek Tounes 2014, 18).

The Ennahdha party is more optimistic about the potential role of Islamic education. Party leader Rached Ghannouchi said, speaking at an event in Washington, “I think that extremism has no future in Tunisia because the Tunisian people usually is a peaceful people and united. There isn’t any justification now in Tunisia to educate a new generation in Tunisia linked with extremism. So this phenomenon is marginalized” (USIP 2014). Ennahdha’s official platform for the 2014 elections goes further: “Ennahdha Party believe that reviving our Zaytouna heritage and Maqasid thought and presenting it in a form that is suitable for our modern times and needs constitutes a principal factor in challenging the deviations and tendencies towards extremist thought that we currently see.” Islamic education is mentioned again in the context of “Immunising Society against Extremism and Social Deviation”
(Ennahdha 2014, 55 & 47). Education here is clearly tied to security and immunizing (bringing to mind Darden’s inoculation) the youth.

Nidaa Tounes is often accused of being the party of the old regime, and their platform certainly fits the tropes, invoking the reform tradition, national elites, the modernist project, Khaireddine, and Habib Bourguiba. Nidaa takes a more kinetic view to preventing terrorism. A section of their platform entitled “Affirm the Authority of the State, Guarantee Security” asserts that there will be zero tolerance policy for incitement to hatred or violence or complicity with terrorism (Nidaa Tounes 2014, 56). This is as far as Nidaa seems to go in suggesting an ideological solution to the terror problem. The only public education platform, aside from some very specific job-training initiatives, is that the schools will be modern, democratic, unified, and mandatory for five to sixteen-year-olds (Nidaa Tounes 2014, 36).

Masmoudi is in favor of a revitalization of the Islamic education system, and indeed CSID is currently engaged in programs that aim to build understanding of Islam and civil values. He says that a more complete understanding of *ijtihad* and *shura* in the general public would go a long way toward dispelling the myth of Islam and democracy’s incompatibility (Personal interview, March 11, 2015).

Zeitouna University students, when asked about how they characterized the government, referred to having a secular government (Ben Ali), an Islamic government (Ennahdha), and now a secular government again (Nidaa Tounes). When asked how Islamic the government had been under Ennahdha, one student said it was as Islamic as the secularists would allow. Another called it “Islam-lite.” Nevertheless, its fall made these students pessimistic about the prospects for Islam in public life (Personal interviews, March 13, 2015).
The inspector in Islamic education expressed frustration with the fact that so many had sought education outside the official Islamic education system, saying it was less organized but also less accountable. In order for the current curriculum to be enough, the inspector said, it would need more time and more prominence in the ministry.

In my opinion (my personal opinion) if we make the students get to know Islam, in its purest form, Islam is the religion of life, the religion of knowledge, the religion of hope, justice, moderation, flexibility, it sees the different dimensions of the human character. This Islam, whose form is beautiful and pure, is what God wanted believers to follow. If there was a chance to know it in the government schools, an opportunity for more depth, even if…the period devoted to studying it was longer, I think it would contribute to creating generations greater in balance, in reconciliation with their past and present, more effective in their environment, and better able to plan for their future (Personal interview, March 12, 2015).

Conclusion & Recommendations

As we look at the development and contestation of Islamic education in Tunisia and Germany, the differences between the cases are clear. Tunisia being an almost all-Muslim country means mandatory Islamic education is uncontroversial but also uninspiring for the average student, especially given the way the state attempts to deliver one narrative about Islam. In Germany, though, even the option of students taking Islam incites debate, and for the students the program seems new and exciting. Germany’s wide array of Muslim sects forces compromise, and their unity is tested by a non-Muslim state. In Tunisia, the state feels comfortable dominating religious life, even as it proclaims itself to be secular. The structures and content created by these conditions also vary. Germany’s programs enjoy a great deal of independence, with university theology programs able to design curricula for the pilot programs in the schools. In Tunisia, both university and school curricula come from the state.

Still, we are much more surprised by the similarities in process. Germany and Tunisia both securitize the teaching of Islam, treating it as one more way to protect state and people from
threats of extremist violence. They have adopted different strategies to do this, with Germany treating it as an integration issue and Tunisia pursuing a national ideology to combat Islamism. Contestation over curriculum, structure, and appointments has also been seen in both systems, often as a result of decisions made pursuing the state’s security interests. This contestation has taken much more diverse forms than citizens versus government, due to the diversity of the Muslim societies in both Germany and Tunisia. This framework, though general, allows us to compare education programs in majority-Muslim and minority-Muslim countries.

**Recommendations**

In the course of our research, we have found some areas where we believe the German and Tunisian education systems could be improved. We enumerate them below.

We suggest that Germany set up programs for the ethnic-German citizen population to receive education about Islam. Germany’s integration policy is directed towards its Muslim population but there has not been anything set up to education the non-Muslim population.

To both Tunisia and Germany, we suggest that extremism will not be defeated by an education program alone, and that it is entirely possible for it to backfire. Therefore we suggest less restriction and more citizen involvement in religious education.

For Germany, when talking about Islamic education, the rhetoric should not contain terms such as integration or security. By doing so, the point of learning, education and religion becomes objectified. Meaning and the original function of each is lost when such terminology is implied.

For German theology centers we suggest that, if possible, teachers and students participate in Islamic practice outside of school or a few minutes after classes. Some of the
students interviewed said that they obtained theoretic information but they felt a lack of practice due to the time constraint.

We suggest that Tunisia (a) make religion classes optional (with a nonsectarian ethics class as the alternative) in the upper levels, (b) increase the amount of time in these classes, (c) move to a format that promotes discussion, and (d) make the classes pass-fail. In addition to bringing the Tunisian system closer to full secularity, this format change could bring some of the vitality and excitement of German Islamic education classes to Tunisian classes. With only students who want to be in the classes attending, the chance for a truly meaningful educational experience is much greater, and taking some pressure off students would change the current “cramming” dynamic of caring about only the grade.

Suggestions for Further Study

This is a field that is ripe for study, and the emerging program in Germany gives a lot of interesting opportunities for a more wide-ranging empirical study. While our study did not have the resources to conduct wide-ranging surveys, now would be a great time to begin surveying Muslim students in Germany not yet in pilot programs as a control group for those who later enroll in Islamic education. Asking students and former students of all ages about their beliefs, practices, and feeling of belonging in Germany would be interesting in its own right, and much more so in comparison with what results may be in a few years. This large-n type study would be just as valuable in Tunisia, especially in comparing the Charfi generation with the previous ones, to try and measure any sort of change.
A more detailed comparison of teacher training would also be interesting in these countries, as well as a more complete picture of the role of international networks of theology programs in students’ education.
Minor & Norris 49


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